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RIGHT ANSWERS AND REALISM: RONALD DWORKIN’S THEORY OF INTEGRITY AS A 
SUCCESSOR TO REALISM 
 
I. Introduction 
 
To the extent that there is such a thing as American Jurisprudence1, Legal Realism2 lies close to 
its foundation. Several critical schools of thought (e.g. Critical Legal Studies) have claimed they 
are the progeny of Realism.3 Other, more scientifically based schools such as jurimetrics or the 
law and economics movement are believed to derive from central claims of Legal Realism.4 
Other scholars, for example Brian Leiter, claim to continue to follow its tenets even if the 
version has been reinterpreted.5 Legal Realism, then, accounts for the beginnings of a number of 
distinctly American legal theories. However, one of the most recognised American theories – 
Ronald Dworkin’s law as integrity – does not make similar statements. Dworkin has never 
claimed Legal Realism as an influence although he is, of course, aware of its theories and has 
                                                 
1 N Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press 1995).  Brian Leiter has, on the other hand, suggested 
that there is no American jurisprudence, or at least none in the sense that Duxbury means. B. Leiter, ‘Is there an 
“American” Jurisprudence’, (1997) 17 OJLS 367-387 reprinted in B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 81-102.  
2 There is, of course, a Scandinavian Legal Realism in addition to the American version. However, the Scandinavian 
version is not one I will consider further. Thus, any reference to Legal Realism or Realism should be taken to mean 
exclusively American Legal Realism.  
3 A. Altman, ‘Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin’ (1986) 15 Philosophy and Public Affairs 205-235, 
207. 
4 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1) 95-96. But see, N. Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (n 1), Chapter 5 
for an alternative view. 
5 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1) 21. 
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engaged with them.6  Indeed, Dworkin and Legal Realism are rarely treated together at all.7 To 
the extent that they are, they are often put on polar opposites specifically in relation to the 
indeterminacy of legal rules. In fact, Leiter has gone so far as to claim Dworkin’s view is a 
‘sophisticated’ view of Formalism.8 
 
This article, however, will contest that view. It will argue that Dworkin’s theory of integrity, in 
many ways, follows on from the important tenets of Legal Realism. His theory of constructive 
interpretation, while it builds upon and develops important Realist themes, requires a 
fundamental acceptance of some of its major conclusions. I wish to be clear what the claim 
entails. I am not suggesting that Ronald Dworkin is a Realist. He is not. So, the suggestion here 
is not that Dworkin is some sort of modern American Legal Realist. Nevertheless, I will argue 
Dworkin and the Realists would find common ground in a number of important concepts. 
These concepts were important central tenets of Realism which Dworkin, explicitly or otherwise, 
has accepted and play foundational roles in his theory of law as integrity. There are crucial 
aspects where he deviates from Realism but Dworkin and the Realists have more in common 
than most think. It should also be made clear that this article will not present the claim that if 
one starts out with a Realist position, then one must end up with Dworkin’s theory of integrity. It 
does not. The claim being made here is a more limited one. Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity 
is one possible conclusion which can be reached from Realist premises. It is not the only 
possibility and nothing I say here should detract from the suggestions about other theorists like 
Lieter or those in the Critical Legal Studies movement that their theories are based upon Legal 
                                                 
6  Pragmatism, as he calls it in Law’s Empire, appears to be a form of Legal Realism as an interpretive theory. R. 
Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press 1986) 151-164. 
7 Frederich Schauer, however, has recently suggested that Dworkin and the Realists are likely to reach similar 
decisions in practice. See Frederich Schauer, “Legal Realism Untamed” (2013) ___ Texas Law Review ___. 
8 B. Leiter, ‘Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?’ (2010) 16 Legal Theory 111-133, 112. 
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Realism. Realism is a broad church and while CLR and Leiter can rightly claim to be successors 
to the Realists, Dworkin could likewise claim inspiration from their views should he wish to do 
so. 
 
To explore these connections it becomes necessary to determine what the central tenets of 
Realism are. This has never been an easy task as the Realists did not all derive their inspiration 
from one central source material nor did they all believe or argue the same sorts of things.9 It 
covers everything from the strict behavioural account of legal practice used by Underhill Moore, 
to the sociological account utilised by Karl Llewellyn, to the Freudian psychology-based 
approach championed by Jerome Frank.10 They did not always agree on everything and even 
major points of criticism of others applied as much to colleagues within the Realist camp as they 
did to those outside.11 Despite this, there are some things which the Realists had in common  
and the first task of this article will be to explore those central ideas. This will be the focus of 
Part II of the article. Part III will then go on to explore some of the important theoretical 
questions which are raised by the Realists which are never completely addressed by the Realists 
themselves. Part IV will then examine how Dworkin’s theory of integrity answers some of these 
resulting issues. The final section will examine what this means for our understandings of both 
Dworkin’s theory as well as American Legal Realism. 
 
II. Central tenets of American Legal Realism 
 
As noted above, determining the central tenets of American Legal Realism is difficult. Due the 
varied interests of those within the camp of American Legal Realism, it can be hard to credit 
                                                 
9  N. Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (n 1) 68. 
10 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1) 16, 28-29. 
11  N. Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (n 1), p. 69; K. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism’ (n 9) 1233-1234. 
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anything as an actual central tenet. Underhill Moore, for example, seemed to spend a large 
majority of his time involved in describing behaviour which was some way related to legal rules.12 
Frank spent most of his time discussing either fact scepticism or the psychological implications 
of the law.13 Others had similarly narrow interests even if some of them were more legal in 
origin.  
 
Karl Llewellyn, however, did indicate that there were a number of characteristics of all Realists. 
He argued that they shared a number of things in common which he sets out in ‘Some Realism 
about Realism’.14  but only five of the nine suggested tenets are ‘characteristic marks’ of Realist 
scholars.15 Those five are the following: 
 
1. ‘the temporary divorce of “Is” and “Ought” for purposes of study’; 
2. … ‘a distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the 
heavily operative factor in producing court decisions’; 
3. ‘the belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases and legal situations into narrower 
categories than has been the practice in the past’; 
4. ‘An insistence on evaluation  of any part of law in terms of its effects, and an 
insistence on the worthwhileness of trying to find these effects’; and 
                                                 
12 U. Moore and C. C. Callahan, ‘Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control’ (1943) 53 Yale Law Journal 1-
136.  
13 J Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Peter Smith 1970; original publication 1930); J. Frank, Courts on Trial (Princeton 
University Press 1949). 
14 K. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism: A Response to Dean Pound’  (1930-1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 
1222-1264. 
15 Ibid. at 1238. 
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5. ‘an insistence on sustained and programmatic attack on the problems of law along 
any of these lines’.16 
 
Brian Leiter has likewise argued that there are central tenets of American Legal Realism. Leiter 
argues the ‘Core Claim’ of Realism is that ‘judges respond primarily to the stimulus of facts.’17 
Leiter wants to draw attention to the word ‘primarily.’ He highlights that the Realists did not 
claim that rules were irrelevant to a judicial decision.18 However, the main thrust of any judicial 
decision is what appears to be most fair under the factual circumstances of the case. This Core 
Claim is further bolstered by what Leiter refers to as the Determination Thesis and the 
Generality Thesis.19    The end result of this is that Realists, according to Leiter, are proponents 
of the following: 
 
‘(1) a descriptive theory about the nature of judicial decision, according to which, (2) judicial 
decisions fall into (sociologically) determined patterns, in which (3) judges reach results based on 
a (generally shared) response to the underlying facts of the case, which (4) they then rationalize 
after-the-fact with appropriate legal rules and reasons.’20 
Taking what both Llewellyn and Leiter state together, general themes emerge which form a basis 
of any claims about Realism. First, Realism is particularly interested in judicial decision-making. 
That is not its only focus but it does have an emphasis on that part of the law. Furthermore, 
                                                 
16 K. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism’ (n 9) at 1236-1238. 
17 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1) 21. 
18  B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1) 21. 
19  B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1) 26. The Determination Thesis is that ‘choice of decision must, in fact, be 
sufficiently fettered so that prediction is possible.’ The Generality Thesis is that ‘these fetters upon choice must not 
be idiosyncratic facts about individual judges, but rather must be of sufficient generality or commonality to be both 
accessible and to admit the sorts of lawful generalizations that make prediction possible.’ 
20 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1) 30. 
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Realists were specifically concerned with the ability to be able to predict judicial decisions. They 
wanted the ability to be able to know in advance the likely result of cases which came before the 
courts. Consequently, they have a specific focus on practical lawyering. In other words, the 
Realists’ prime concern was not philosophical matters but legal ones.  A result which was 
philosophically unsound would still have been a useful one, from their position, provided it was 
legally helpful. 
 
In addition to this emphasis on practical lawyering, prediction and judicial decision-making, the 
Realists were also keen to explore the use of additional material (usually from social sciences) 
beyond the commonly accepted legal sources.21 This had two implications. First, the Realists 
used these additional materials to aid and bolster the prediction enterprise. They thought that 
these additional materials could provide them with an ability to better predict the results of cases 
before the courts. They did not always agree on what materials were best placed to help in that 
regard but they did broaden the use of materials beyond those which had previously been used. 
Moreover, they found that additional materials provided further methods to evaluate and assess 
the law.  This provided a benefit to the Realist movement because they wanted to explore not 
only the way the law worked but also how to make it work more effectively. The use of these 
broader materials allowed not only the prediction project to progress but also provided a needed 
constructive way to evaluate the law. It meant that the Realists had a much more inclusive idea as 
to what was relevant for law than previous jurisprudential theorists might have done. 
 
                                                 
21 Not all of their efforts to increase the ability to accurately predict results relied, however, on the use of social 
science. For example, Llewellyn spent a considerable amount of time focusing on the difference between ‘paper 
rules’ and ‘real rules’. K. Llewellyn, “A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step” (1930) 30 Columbia Law Review p. 
447-453. 
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One additional theme of Realism was the indeterminacy of legal rules. This theme developed 
from the broad themes discussed in the previous two paragraphs. While a focus on prediction or 
the use of social science research in exploring the law are methodological themes, the 
indeterminacy of legal rules is different. Instead of being about the methods used by the Realists, 
the idea that the standard written rules did not always determine the outcome in (at least some) 
concrete cases was a conclusion reached because of those approaches.22 Even so, it is one of the 
themes of Realism which is most likely to get distorted in discussion. Some have argued that the 
claim attributed to the Realists is overstated. The claim made is that the Realists argued that the 
law was globally indeterminate. Leiter argues that the Realists’ claims were only locally 
indeterminate and, in particular, limited to those cases which came before the courts.23 Whether 
or not this is an accurate statement of the Realist position, the Realists did claim that cases were 
pervasively indeterminate even if not globally so.24 A comparison helps to illustrate this point. 
H.L.A. Hart argued that indeterminacy in law was only in cases of ‘open texture’.25 The law was 
subject to open texture because we are not clear about language. Words that we use have a ‘core 
of certainty’ and a ‘penumbra of doubt’.26 The ‘core of certainty’ consisted of those referents of a 
word which everyone agreed were contained within the definition. The ‘penumbra of doubt’ 
affected those cases where it was not clear if the word in question covered them or not. In his 
                                                 
22 Frederich Schauer, “Legal Realism Untamed” (n 7). It should be noted the difference between particularlism  (the 
idea that a case is determined by factors unique to that case and therefore each decision is individualistic) and the 
view that factors outside the specified rules might determine the outcome in cases. The second view need not be 
particularistic if there is a pattern to those decisions even if that pattern involves factors outside of legal reasons as 
we generally conceive them. The Realists tended to take the latter view even if they are often believed to be 
proponents of particularlism. See Ibid. 
23 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1).  
24 Frederich Schauer, “Legal Realism Untamed” (n 7). 
25 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd Edition) (Clarendon Press 1994) 123, 128-136. 
26 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (n 29) 123. 
8 
 
seminal example, Hart argued that a car would fit within the ‘core of certainty’ of the word 
‘vehicle’; a bicycle or skateboard, on the other hand, were less clear and covered by the 
‘penumbra of doubt’.27 For Hart, these cases occurred because we were not always specific 
enough about our use of language.28 In addition, we were bad at predicting the future and thus 
new information was rarely covered explicitly in a rule.29 
 
The Realists did not believe that indeterminacy claims were so limited. They would have argued 
that Hart’s ‘open texture’ was only part of the picture. Facts could often be indeterminate in the 
sense that they were filtered through witnesses or judges’ perceptions of importance and thus 
important information might be misremembered or valued differently by a judge.30 There were 
also  a number of rules which could potentially be in play in a particular caseand the judges 
determined which rule applied and why it did so. 31  Additionally, a judge might read cases 
differently from her predecessors and apply rules in a different manner.32 Finally, there might be 
cases where judges applied rules only after they had reached a decision on other grounds and the 
rules therefore only played a post hoc justificatory role.33 To the Realists judicial decision-making 
was a complex activity and the prediction of it included not only an understanding of the 
language used in the rule but of surrounding factors, all of which might affect the ability of the 
rule to determine the outcome in a concrete case. 
 
                                                 
27 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (n 29) 128-129. 
28 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (n 29) 128-129. 
29 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (n 29) 128-129. 
30 J Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (n 14). 
31 Llewellyn, ‘Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be 
Construed’, (1950) 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395. 
32 K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (Oceana Publications 1951) 180. 
33 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1) 30. 
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Two examples highlight the distinction between the two positions. Those two cases are Brown v. 
Board of Education,34 the famous US Supreme Court case on the desegregation of schools and R v. 
R,35 the UK criminal case which outlawed the marital rape exception.36  Both cases are 
indeterminate as the rule set down in previous cases was not followed.37 Indeed, both cases 
overruled the pre-existing legal rule– Brown overruled Plessy v. Ferguson38 and R v. R overruled, 
among others, R v. Clarence.39 Neither decision involves what Hart referred to as open texture. 
Brown was covered by the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine set down in Plessy. R v. R fits within the 
rule in Clarence. Nor is it a case where the facts in the subsequent cases (Brown, R v. R) were not 
envisaged at the time of the previous cases (Plessy, Clarence). R v. R is the same sort of case as 
Clarence on this issue.40 While Plessy dealt with railroad cars and not education systems (as Brown 
did), educational systems were around during that time and the language of Plessy is broad 
                                                 
34 (1954) 347 U.S. 483.  
35 [1992] 1 A.C. 599. 
36  The Marital Rape Exception was a rule in UK criminal law that a wife, by virtue of getting married, had 
consented to all physical intercourse. It was therefore not legally possible for a husband to rape his wife. [1992] 1 
A.C. 599 at 603-604. The genesis of the exception appears to be Sir Matthew Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown 
(1736). Ibid. at 604. 
37 The same claim could be made about Riggs v. Palmer, the case famously used as an example by Ronald Dworkin. 
The Wills statute at issue in that case appears to be relatively clear on point. However, because the case is linked so 
readily to Dworkin’s views on integrity and the law, other cases provide a better test for exploration for our 
purposes. 
38 (1896) 163 U.S. 537. 
39 (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23. 
40 R. v. R is certainly a clearer case of the marital rape exception. Clarence dealt with a wife who had developed a STD 
from intercourse with her husband who, while knowing he had the disease, did not inform his wife. The argument 
was that the fact that he had a STD but had not disclosed it vitiated the consent his wife had given to sexual 
relations. The court ruled that was not possible since, at least in part, she had consented to the marriage and that 
meant, necessarily, that she had consented to any and all sexual contact. 
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enough to cover any societal arrangement.41 They are not cases based upon our inability to see 
the future like determining a case raising the question whether a Segway fits into Hart’s 1960s 
statute prohibiting vehicles in the park. Furthermore, in neither case does the court rely on 
language to change the applicable rule but overrule the previous decision. 
 
What is particularly interesting about these two cases is that it would have been possible to make a 
case relying on Hartian open texture for the decision. The Court in Brown could have argued that 
the Topeka School Board needed to bus black students to the ‘white’ school merely because they 
had failed to satisfy Plessy’s ‘separate but equal’ test.42 In general, the facilities provided to black 
students did not fit under the standard definition of equal if equal means something beyond 
merely providing something within the same class to different groups.43 They could have argued 
instead that equal meant that the facilities had to be of the same standard. Likewise, in R v. R, the 
                                                 
41 Plessy v. Ferguson, (1896) 163 U.S. 537, 544. The Supreme Court specifically mentions schools noting : ‘The most 
common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, 
which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights 
of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.’ Ibid. At several points, the Supreme Court uses 
the argument that, since it is acceptable in education to separate out the races (relying heavily on the fact that the 
D.C. School District was segregated), then it must be acceptable for train companies to do the same. Ibid. at 544-
545, 545,551. 
42 Indeed, the lower court decisions in Brown involve four separate School Districts (Topeka, Kansas; Clarendon 
County, South Carolina; Prince Edward County, Virginia; and New Castle County, Delaware) and there was an 
examination of whether those School Districts did provide ‘equal’ treatment. (1954) 347 U.S. 483, 486. In the cases 
themselves, the Kansas schools were considered to be equal but those in South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware 
were not. According to Chief Justice Earl Warren (who wrote the opinion of the Court), equalization measures had 
either been completed or were ‘well on their way’ by the time of the Court’s decision. Ibid. at 492. 
43 As noted in n 47, the four School districts in question might have been exceptions to the rule. Nevertheless, 
anyone wanting a visual representation of the extent to which ‘separate but equal’ wasn’t really equal need only look 
at pictures of, for example, water fountains in the segregated South during this period. 
11 
 
married couple had separated prior to the rape in question and the woman lived in a different 
house from the husband at the time of the rape.44 The court could have argued that the marital 
rape exception did not apply under the circumstances as the separation had changed the 
applicable rule.45 In neither case did the court in question take this way out. Instead, they argued 
that subsequent legal principles had made the previous rule unsound (if it had ever been sound) 
and the previous decisions were overruled.46   
 
It is this sort of case that the Realists want to explore. Ambiguity of language is an important 
aspect of the law, but cases in which the court reaches a decision which does not follow clearly 
from previous decisions for other reasons are also worthy of consideration. To the Realists, this 
was all part of the same indeterminacy problem. In their thinking, there were a multitude of 
reasons why decisions might be unclear and we needed a comprehensive method for exploring 
the relevant issues. The Realists, unlike Hart, conceived of legal indeterminacy as being a broad 
practice involving a number of different factors all of which could potentially be applicable in a 
given case. They considered this all part of one process involved in judicial decision-making. So, 
Hart probably would have had a response to the issues created by Brown and R v. R. They just 
                                                 
44  [1992] 1 A.C. 599, 614-615. 
45  The Court of Appeal, it should be pointed out, does consider this possibility. It had been used in previous cases 
to outline exceptions based upon the issuance of a decree nisi, express arrangement by the couple, or by court order. 
The Court of Appeal, however, decides instead that ‘the law should declare that a rapist remains a rapist subject to 
the criminal law, irrespective of his relationship with his victim.’ Ibid. at 611. There is discussion by both the Court 
of Appeal and the House of Lords as to the word ‘unlawfully’ in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, 
section 1(1). Ibid. at 610-611, 623. In particular, the question that arises is whether the Act of 1976 enshrines the 
Marital Rape Exception in the law such that it cannot be removed by the Court. That issue, then, is somewhat 
subsidiary to the question as to whether or not the Marital Rape Exception is a valid exception in common law. 
46 Brown v. Board of Education, (1954) 347 U.S. 483, 494-495; R v. R.[1992] 1 A.C. 599, 623. 
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would not have been covered by his conception of open texture. To the Realists, however, all of 
these sorts of issues were contained within the heading of legal indeterminacy.  
 
 
In conclusion, we can state there are a number of important things we might find as indicative of 
the Realist position. They were particularly focused on practical lawyering as well as judicial 
decision-making. This included the ability to be able to predict the decisions that judges and 
courts might make in disputes which came before them. They also looked to expand the number 
of relevant sources of information which were considered both in relation to legal decision-
making as well as to the process of evaluating legal decisions. This included a complex notion of 
what constituted legal indeterminacy which was grounded in the notion of a broad, pervasive 
conception of when the rules could be indeterminate and what the causes of that indeterminacy 
were.  
III. Issues arising from Realism 
 
There are two main issues which are brought up by the Realist examination of the law but are 
not resolved by it. The first question is what constitute legal reasons for actions. In other words, 
what is encompassed by the word law? This is a standard question in legal philosophy but it takes 
on a special importance for the Realist project. Because of Realists’ understanding of legal 
indeterminacy and their acknowledgement of the expanding class of available reasons for action, 
they cannot identify the distinction between legal and non-legal reasons by reference to the job 
performed by those reasons. Both types can provide reasons for legal decision-making. We could 
determine that something is a legal reason for action by looking to its source, but that also 
provides difficulties for the Realists. Since legal decisions are likely sources of law and the 
reasons for those decisions need not necessarily be law-related reasons, the Realists would need 
to explain how the action of a judge speaking or writing turned a non-legal reason into a legal 
13 
 
one. Again, the easy answer (that the act of speaking or writing by a judge creates a legal reason 
for action) would not likely work. Not everything a judge speaks or writes would work as a legal 
reason (for example, a letter written to a friend). Even if it were limited to those times when a 
judge was specifically acting as a judge, this argument would not be particularly effective. If a 
judge stated that they had decided a particular decision by flipping a coin, the legal community 
would not see that as a legal reason for the decision even if the judge had, in fact, decided by that 
method. There must be some further criteria for distinguishing between legal reasons for actions 
and those non-legal reasons. Additionally, the Realists would be required to hold that there is a 
distinction between certain reasons called legal and those which are not because the use of post-
hoc justifications which they frequently commented on requires it. If all reasons are potentially 
legal reasons for action, then there is nothing wrong with using ‘non-legal’ reasons as 
justification. It is only if  non-legal actions are seen as unjustifiable reasons for decisions that 
judges need to rely on so called ‘legal’ ones.  
 
This classification issue has bite because of the more overarching question of justification. Any 
legal system must provide reasons for individuals to abide by it if that legal system is going to 
continue to exist. We must accept those decisions made by those acting under legal authority as 
binding. This causes particular problems for Realists because of the varied influences on legal 
decision-making. There must be an explanation why a decision taken by a judge based on extra-
legal factorsprovides a sufficient reason for holding that (1) we are required to follow that 
decision, and (2) society is entitled to believe that we will follow the decision. The argument in 
support of the legitimacy of law is easy to make in situations where the grounds for our legal 
decisions are limited to legal reasons for action. If judges could only make decisions based upon 
previous case law and statutes, authority for such decisions is on the basis of the existing rules – 
for example, that they offer fair warning of likely legal consequences, that they have been subject 
to democratic review or that they are authorized by a social contract. However, if the Realist 
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critique is accurate, then decisions are being made for reasons which have not been previously 
agreed, are not vetted in the public sphere and are, at least sometimes, hidden from view. Such 
decisions are ones we would consider suspect in terms of legitimacy and justification. Since these 
decisions are, in some sense, extra-legal in that they do not rely on legal reasons for action, then 
even if the overall legal system is justified, these particular decisions may not be. 
 
We can explore this by way of example. Suppose we had Holmes’ famous ‘bad man’.47 Let us 
further suppose that our bad man lives in the community covered by H.L.A. Hart’s ‘no vehicles 
in the park.’48 Our bad man wishes to bring a bicycle into the park but does not want to suffer 
any adverse legal consequences for doing so. Bicycles have been allowed in the park before. 
However, they were children’s bicycles and our bad man wants to bring in a heavy-duty 
mountain bike so he can train for an upcoming race. The bad man examines all of the 
information related to the regulation and decides that since bicycles have been allowed in the 
past, he is likely to be allowed to use his bicycle as well. To his surprise, when he brings his 
bicycle into the park, he is cited for violating the regulation. When he contests this decision in 
court, he is told by the judge that he cannot bring a bicycle into the park as it is a vehicle. In 
particular, the judge relies on safety arguments to argue that the legislative body in question 
meant to include bicycles within the definition of vehicle. This is over the protestations of the 
bad man who, having looked through the law in question and the cases interpreting it, asserts 
that no previous decision has made any mention of ‘safety’ when determining the definition of 
vehicle under the rule. 
 
Under this scenario, why should our bad man feel that the judge’s decision is a legitimate legal 
decision? We could fall back on the argument that if he fails to abide by the decision, he is 
                                                 
47 O. W. Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’, (1897)10 Harvard Law Review 457, 460-461. 
48 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (n 29) 128-129. 
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subject to sanctions (e.g. a fine) and if he fails to comply with the sanctions, further more 
powerful sanctions might be applied (e.g. incarceration). That does not necessarily provide a 
justification for the decision; it merely coerces our bad man to accept it. If we do not rely on 
coercion (for example, if we want to argue that the decision should be considered right or 
proper), we need to look somewhere else. Nor would it be useful to argue that the Realists did 
not concern themselves overmuch with this justification problem.49 Even if they did not care 
about legitimacy and justification, nothing prevents us from asking the question in relation to 
their theory.  
Additionally, if the Realist critique is accurate, weneed some justification for the system as a 
whole or at least the way the system is run. Whywould we design a system which allows judges to 
make decisions based upon non-legal factors? Could we notdevelop some sort of mechanistic 
system for determining answers in cases other than Hart’s open texture ones? Could we not 
require that our legislatures be more specific when developing statutes? Alternatively, could we 
not construct a rule when anything which is not specifically prohibited is excluded from 
regulation? To put the questions another way, why do we persist with the legal system we have? 
Why do we put such power into the hands of a few individuals, often ones who are neither 
representative of the population at large nor democratically elected? In order to justify the legal 
system as a whole we need some semblance of an answer to these sorts of questions. Moreover, 
these questions persist even if we are only interested in a purely descriptive account of the law. 
We must still have some understanding as to why individuals within a system feel bound by it. 
We must understand why it is that they feel an obligation (using Hart’s terminology)50 to obey 
                                                 
49 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1)114-115. 
50 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (n 29) p. 6-7. 
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the law despite misgivings we might have about the way the system operates.51 We must also 
have an explanation for why individuals continue to abide by the law even when it is against their 
interests to do so. We must further explain why judges, when acting in their official capacity, act 
as if they can provide justifications for their actions and expect that these will be accepted as 
right and proper ones. We must understand why it is that judges continue to couch their 
decisions in legal language and legal reasons even if, at least some of the time, the answer they 
give is not truly why they decided as they did. 
 
Realism does not really give us answers to these questions. The Realists provide us with a reliable 
description of what is occurring in legal decision-making but cannot provide us with an answer 
as to why that ought to be the case. Even when they provide optimal ways of working within the 
systemthey do not tell us why the legal system needs to be in such a state as to require those 
optimal ways in the first place. We need to look elsewhere. 
 
IV. Dworkin as an answer to Realist issues 
 
If Realism cannot provide us with an answer to these important questions, another theory can 
provide it without requiring that we abandon the conclusions from Realism that we wish to keep. 
Those looking for an answer to justificatory questions while still maintaining the basic tenets of 
Realism can look to Dworkin’s law as integrity to provide them. In other words, Dworkin’s 
theory is not incompatible with Realism.  
 
                                                 
51 We might, indeed, even question whether or not people actually feel an obligation to obey the law. This is 
presumably an empirical question (or could be an empirical question) but I am not aware of anyone who has ever 
explored it empirically. I am grateful to Frederich Schauer for bringing this point to my attention. 
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It is worth beginning that discussion by examining the existing parallels between Realism and 
Dworkin’s work. One fundamental parallel between the two is that both focus on judicial 
decision-making. The Realists, as mentioned above, paid particular attention to the role of 
judges, both at the trial court and at the appellate level. Dworkin, with the focus on law as 
integrity, Hercules and the right answer thesis,52 also focuses on the judicial aspect of law.53 This 
does not mean they exclusively focus on judicial decisions because neither does but the judicial 
aspect of law is more important in their theories of law than, for example, it is in Austin, Kelsen 
or even Hart. Moreover, both focuson practical lawyering. Dworkin gives a special prominence 
to exploring the question of legal disputes and disagreement.54 Thisemphasizes the question of 
how it is that legal professionals can disagree about the fundamental claims of a particular legal 
system.55 The question in its simplest form is a pragmatic one – how do we explain legal 
disagreement? Dworkin and the Realists pay attention to such questions even if other legal 
theorists like Austin, Kelsen and Hart do not. Both Dworkin and the Realists often use case law 
to provide examples of particular claims.56 Their purpose in doing so is to evaluate not only the 
theoretical basis of law, but to actually test whether that basis is correct. Both think they are 
                                                 
52 The extent to which Dworkin still maintains the relevant thesis as a ‘right answer’ thesis as opposed to a ‘best 
answer’ thesis is a bit murky. Many contend that Dworkin now talks about ‘best answers’ as opposed to ‘right 
answers’. However, the most recent complete statement of his views on law (Justice in Robes) still maintains at least 
some focus on ‘right’ answers and a 2006 book which explores his views makes repeated references to right answers, 
a characterization he does not refute in his response. S. Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of 
Ronald Dworkin (Oxford University Press 2006). As best I can tell, then, Dworkin’s view is still largely similar on 
point to the one he has always professed and any distinction between a ‘right’ answer and a ‘best’ one is semantic. 
Even if this is not true, I am not sure it changes any of the analysis in this article.  
53 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 6) 14-15. 
54 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 6) 6-7. 
55 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 6). 3-6. 
56 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 6). 15-30. 
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providing a method by which judges can explore their own legal decision-making or to evaluate 
the real life decisions that judges make.  
 
Furthermore, both seek to expand the number of reasons available for evaluating the decisions 
of legal decision-makers, although the types of reasons are not the same. While the Realists 
looked to social science data, personal idiosyncrasies of the judges or other similar factors, 
Dworkin has focused his attention on principles.57 There are differences in methodology but 
both look to increase the number of reasons found to explain legal decisions beyond legal rules, 
whether derived from statute or previous court decision.  
These parallels between Dworkin’s theory of integrity and Realism show the cross-germination 
between the two theories. However, it might be argued that these similarities are insufficient on 
their own and there is the very real question of legal indeterminacy to consider. While the 
Realists were keen to argue that the law was at least partially indeterminate, Dworkin has 
maintained that legal principles reduce the indeterminacy of law.58 Some might argue that despite 
any initial facial likenesses between the two theories, the essential claim about indeterminacy 
creates an insurmountable barrier between the two. A deeper analysis reveals this is not the case. 
While Dworkin does argue that integrity minimizes (if not completely eliminates) a multitude of 
answers to a particular legal question, this is not because of a fundamental disagreement with the 
Realist project as such. Dworkin must initially hold something close to the Realist conclusion on 
indeterminacy for the argument for principles to have any meaning. At the very least, he must 
start from a position much closer to Realism than it is to Hart’s notion of open texture. 
 
In order to understand this, we must explore why Dworkin thinks principles are so important. 
For Dworkin, legal rules cannot account for a number of cases. They are too inflexible and too 
                                                 
57 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd. 1977) 
58 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 6). 
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all or nothing to be able to adequately explain the complexity of legal decision-making. They 
cannot, for example, explain the decision of the US Supreme Court in Brown, one of the 
decisions he notes at the beginning of Law’s Empire.59 Dworkin likewise sees ‘hard cases’ as being 
a more comprehensive phenomenon than Hart ever admits.60 For Hart, they are a small number 
of decisions;61 Dworkin, on the other hand, argues that hard cases are frequent in the law.62 
Dworkin argues that there are similarities between lines of cases which are used to bring 
disparate legal issues together in order to provide a means for resolving these cases. Those 
connections are what he calls principles. Brown, consequently, can be explained as a decision 
about something larger than the inflexible legal rules associated with previous cases like Plessy. It 
is a discussion of equality, a connection between a number of different sorts of cases so that the 
decision in Brown fits into the larger legal system.63 All of these disparate cases form a coherent 
system by being mutually supportive of each other. 
 
Principles, then, are broad statements which express moral beliefs within a particular 
community.64 They apply across a range of cases and interact with other principles as well as legal 
rules in order to provide the most convincing legal arrangement possible under the 
circumstances.65 This idea of principles is much more expansive than is necessary to deal with 
uncertainty in a Hartian ‘open texture’ sense. If the only type of indeterminacy was based upon 
the penumbra of doubt, it is unnecessary to consider broad principles which apply to a large 
                                                 
59 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 6) 29-30. 
60 For example, he states that any case from any case textbook would provide examples of the principles he is talking 
about. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 71) 23. 
61 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (n 29)154. 
62 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 71) 81-130. 
63 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 6) 379-392. 
64 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 71) 82. 
65 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 71). 81-130; R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 6) 95-96. 
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range of cases and bind the system together. There would be no need to go through that process 
in a majority of cases that the principles themselves would be superfluous. However, if the 
indeterminacy that Dworkin is considering is the pervasive one used by the Realists, then 
principles become a more reasonable idea. If almost any case might be subject to indeterminacy 
based upon the facts, a disparate collection of rules, or other factors then moral principles which 
bind the legal system into a coherent whole become necessary. In other words, there is no reason 
to have a broad principle to explain whether a bicycle is a vehicle or not under a simple 
regulation prohibiting vehicles in the park. We do need principles to explain decisions such as 
Brown and R v R. Dworkin starts from a position that the pervasive indeterminacy of the Realists 
is a more accurate assessment of legal decision-making than the more limited notion of ‘open 
texture’ presented by Hart since it is only a more pervasive and comprehensive indeterminacy 
which requires the use of principles in the way that Dworkin uses them. The pervasive legal 
indeterminacy of the Realists is not an anathema to the Dworkinian use of principles, it is a 
precursor to it. The Realists’ ideas about indeterminacy provide support for an important 
presumption Dworkin makes about the law. As a result, it does not adversely affect the ability to 
see connections between the two sets of theories but supplements the similarities which have 
already been discussed. 
 
With this understanding, it then becomes possible to explain how Dworkin’s law as integrity can 
plug the justification gap left by the Realist critique of law. That way is the right answer thesis 
that Dworkin provides.66 To explain this, let us return to our bad man wanting to bring a bicycle 
into the park. Our bad man brought a bicycle into a park covered by a rule which stated that ‘no 
vehicles were allowed in the park.’ Having explored the statute and previous case law, our bad 
man had determined that there was no specific part of the legislation which prohibited bicycles 
                                                 
66 R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press 2006) 41 -43. Again, I do not think this analysis 
changes if we consider Dworkin to now hold a ‘best’ answer thesis as opposed to a ‘right’ answer one. See n 63.  
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per se nor was there any case law which prohibited bicycles. Despite this, when the case came 
before a judge, it was determined by that judge that bicycles were included within the definition 
of ‘vehicle’ such that bringing one into the park constituted a violation of the law. Let us 
suppose, however, that the jurisdiction in question is slightly different from ours in terms of 
procedure. The law is exactly the same but litigants have the possibility after the court has made 
a decision to question it. Once a decision has been handed down, the judge must discuss that 
decision with the parties in question should they wish to do so. Our bad man requests such a 
discussion with the judge and asks why the court ruled the way it did despite the fact that there 
was no specific mention of prohibiting bicycles either in the legislation itself or in the previous 
case law. Our judge has several responses available to her. She could reiterate the safety concerns 
which formed the essential part of the judgment itself. This will not provide much help. Our bad 
man will  ask where these safety concerns came from since they did not appear in either the 
statute or previous case law. What our judge will need to do is to provide a reason as to why 
those safety concerns could be used to make a decision, even if they were not specifically noted 
in the law before this case.  
 
Note that the use of the Hartian response to our bad man is will not be an effective mechanism. 
If our judge argues that there is a penumbra of doubt about the word vehicle and that she 
exercised her discretion in order to determine that ‘bicycle’ was covered, this will lead to serious 
problems with our bad man. He will argue that this exceeded her authority (since she should only 
act on the basis of the law, not on her ‘discretion’). Even if he does not do that, he will ask why 
she exercised her discretion in this particular way. Why, he might ask, did she exercise her 
discretion in order to find him guilty of violating the law instead of using her discretion in order 
to find him not-guilty? Our judge needs an answer to this question in order to satisfy the bad 
man and one that does not circle back to the safety concerns. If our judge answers ‘Because I 
thought the safety concerns were important’, this only leads back to the same questions as to 
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why the judge was entitled to consider them in the first place. Alternatively, the judge could fall 
back on claims of authority. She could claim that she was entitled to decide the way she did 
because that is the job she has been given by our legal system. The decision is therefore 
authorized by the position she holds. That also would not find the support of our bad man. He 
will argue in response that the mere fact that her position gives her the authority to make 
decisions in the legal system does not mean that authority is unfettered. She would not, for 
example, be able to sentence him to death or public flogging for breaking the statute in question. 
Such a decision on her part would be an abuse of power. Why then, is her decision not a similar 
abuse of power, again because there is no specific indication that bicycles are covered? In other 
words, even if our bad man accepts that her role as judge provides her the authority to make 
decisions generally, it does not follow that it justifies this decision in this case. Moreover, neither 
argument will necessarily prevent our bad man from bringing his bicycle into the park on 
subsequent occasions. Both justifications – the Hartian open texture one or the one based upon 
her authority as judge – can be seen as being personal to the specific judge. Our bad man, then, 
may decide in subsequent cases to try his luck with different judges.67 While our first judge might 
decide that bicycles are covered, the second (and third, etc.) may not.    
 
If our judge wants to assuage the bad man, she needs to convince him that the decision she 
made was the correct one, despite what he perceives to be a lack of grounding for it. In order to 
do that, our judge is going to have to provide evidence that safety concerns are valid even if they 
are not specifically stated in the statute or covered by previous case law. One way to do that will 
be to show our bad man that other courts have used safety concerns before in a range of cases, 
even where there was not a previous statement about safety in case law or statute. While that is 
an important part, it is not the only part. She will further need to explain why this case is similar 
                                                 
67 This is the concern with particularism in relation to judicial decisions. If we cannot presume that the decisions 
have some sort of general application, then there is nothing to prevent an individual from attempting an action 
which brought a sanction in an initial case to try again. This point will be considered more fully in Section V. 
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enough to other cases where safety has been an issue for it to be an acceptable reason for the 
decision here. She would likely further have to argue why, even if there are alternative possible 
justifications for decisions, the one she has chosen in the best one to have used under the 
circumstances. Notice that she cannot simply claim that her decision is one of a range of possible 
alternatives. She cannot simply claim that her decision is based upon a reasoned argument but 
that there were alternatives which were just as likely. Our bad man will simply insist she justify 
why she did not choose one of those other alternatives which would allow him to bring his 
bicycle into the park. She must claim that her decision is right or correct or best under the 
circumstances. That does not mean that she cannot accept that our bad man has made a 
reasoned and reasonable argument. She must have to claim, however, that hers is better than all 
alternatives. Moreover, she needs to claim that her decision is not just right or best in her 
opinion but right objectively. Her claim has to be stronger than simply a claim of preference on 
her part for the argument she has given. If she merely claims a preference, then our bad man will 
simply query why her preference is better than his – why it is entitled to greater weight.68 If she 
cannot, then it simply becomes a claim about taste much like someone’s preference for baseball 
over football. If she wishes to justify her decision, she needs to be able to state to the bad man 
that her decision is best not only for her, but for everyone. It must be an objectively true 
statement of the law. 
 
What has been described, though, is no different than Dworkin’s right answer thesis. Hemakes 
the following statement of the right answer thesis: 
 
                                                 
68 It is possible that our judge will return to the argument about authority. However, the same problems would exist 
here as it does with the use of it earlier. Our bad man would argue that, even if she has general authority, it only 
exists in situations where she is acting appropriately. If she is exceeding her authority (as he would claim she is doing 
here), then it provides no greater justification for her decision now than it did before. 
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It is a claim made within legal practice rather than at some supposedly removed, external 
philosophical level. I ask whether, in the ordinary sense in which lawyers might say this, it 
is ever sound or correct or accurate to say, about some hard case, that the law, properly 
interpreted, is for the plaintiff (or for the defendant.).69 
 
He further states:  
 
Have you yourself found any ordinary legal argument on balance the soundest, in any kind 
of hard case? Then you, too, have rejected the no-right-answer thesis I take to be the target 
of my own claim.70 
 
Dworkin’s thesis thus requires that judges be able to make decisions which are objectively right, 
which is what our judge has attempted to do in this case. Her decision, if she wants to be able to 
justify it to our bad man, must be a decision which she can claim to be right and to be right 
objectively. She must be able to claim this despite the fact that others might disagree. In other 
words, she can accept that others might come to a different conclusion but that those 
conclusions are not as good as hers despite the fact that they may be reasoned and reasonable 
arguments. None of this, however, requires a refutation of the indeterminacy thesis as the 
Realists conceived of it. In fact, it requires the indeterminacy thesis as a starting point. It must 
start from the idea that cases are indeterminate in the pervasive way the Realists discussed in 
order for the right answer thesis to have sufficient bite. 
 
Additionally, this reasoning works in the more complex cases of judicial decision-making used in 
Brown and R v. R. In both cases, the side which ultimately lost (the School District of Topeka, 
                                                 
69 R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 82) 41. 
70 R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 82) 42. 
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Kansas in Brown and the husband in R v R) would have, given the opportunity, questioned the 
decisions given in their respective cases. Indeed, in their cases, they probably have a stronger 
argument than our bad man since there was actual case law in their favour prior to their actions. 
In order to justify those decisions, the judges would have to use the right answer thesis to 
convince them. They would need to argue that the previous cases, despite being legal decisions 
which argued that their actions were acceptable, were not the best statement of the law. In order 
to do this, they would need to show that higher values (e.g. equality under the law) were the most 
crucial values at stake and those values required the decision that the judges made. They would 
have to argue that these were the correct decision no matter which judge made them even 
though previous judges had, in effect, gotten it wrong.71  
 
 
 
Dworkin’s theory of integrity, then, fills the justification gap which exists in the Realist 
explanation of the law without forcing one to refute many of the central claims of Realism. It  
also provides further benefits. First, it can help explain cases which the Realists have often had 
trouble with – those cases where the judge appears compelled to reach a decision despite being 
against it. Realist approaches to judicial decision-making suggest that judges, often have enough 
flexibility to avoid reaching decisions which they find to be wrong. They ought to be able to 
manipulate precedents, the language in statutes, etc., so that they can reach a conclusion which 
                                                 
71 In making this claim, I do not want to forestall the idea that principles can change over time. It may be that a 
principle which was at one time valid has ceased to have validity and therefore decisions based upon that principle in 
the past are likewise invalid. That change, though, may be attributed to the creation of new, more important 
principles (or at least more important at the present time) and we would need a way to explain this. Moreover, even 
if principles lose their validity, we need some method for being able to explain to members of society why a 
principle, which was at one time valid, no longer is. So, even if the judge does not make the claim that previous 
judges made a wrong decision in a case, they must be able to explain why that decision would not be right now. 
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they find satisfactory. That is not always the case. Sometimes judges reach decisions which they 
feel are compelled by previous case law or statute even though they do not believe they are the 
right decisions on some other metric (e.g. morally, politically, or on policy grounds). Dworkin’s 
theory can provide us with an answer to that question. Judges in these cases feel bound to reach 
the best decision in light of the previous law. Even if they personally disagree with the decision, a 
judge can come to a conclusion that a particular interpretation is the best legal answer in a 
specific case. One can decide that a particular answer is the best one, even if it is not personally a 
satisfactory one.72 
 
 
                                                 
72 To provide a personal (admittedly anecdotal) example, I once worked for a trial court judge in Pennsylvania as a 
law clerk. One of the cases brought before the judge was a contract dispute involving the construction of a garage. 
The homeowners had contracted with a construction company for the construction of the garage to their 
specifications but were unhappy with the result and wished not to pay the amount owed. While their claims in 
contract had failed, their lawyer also relied on the Consumer Protection Law in Pennsylvania at the time. That law 
required that any sale involving a ‘contact at the home’ required that the purchasing party receive notice they had the 
right to rescind the contract within three days. If the notification was not provided at the time the initial contract 
was signed (which it is was not in this case), then the notification period began to run once the purchasing party 
became aware of the right to rescind (i.e. when their lawyer told them about it). ‘Contact at the home’ had been 
determined earlier by the appellate courts to include cases such as construction ones despite the purpose of the law 
being to deal with high-pressure door-to-door sales. Utililizing the Consumer Protection Law, the homeowners then 
rescinded the contract. There was a provision within the statute that required the return of the items purchased but 
only if the selling party requested them within a set time period. Because the items in question were incapable of 
being returned, the attorney for the contractor did not request them back. At oral argument, the lawyer for the 
homeowners admitted that, if the materials had been requested, they would have been unable to provide them and 
the Consumer Protection ground would have failed. However, since they were not, they were simply not required to 
return them. While the judge I worked for thought the decision reached a dreadful result, the law did appear to 
require that he rule in favour of the homeowners and allow them to rescind the contract without having to ‘return’ 
the garage. 
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V. Conclusions  
 
In conclusion,there are still significant differences between law as integrity and Legal Realism. 
There are also a number of similarities and one need not give up all of the central tenets of either 
theory to accept that the other theory has benefits. For at least a couple of reasons, this answer 
might not be surprising. Dworkin, does treat pragmatism less harshly than conventionalism. He, 
for example, claims that it ‘so far from fitting our legal practices worse than conventionalism 
does, fits them better.’73 More relevantis Karl Llewellyn’s approach to judicial decision-making 
which he terms ‘Grand Style’.74 For Llewellyn, there were two types of judicial decision-making. 
The first, formal style, was a mechanistic way of making decisions involving only the logical 
extension of previous cases and nothing further – no further understanding of policy, principle 
or broader values.75 Grand Style, however, was expansive. It considered a broader range of 
materials including important issues of principle.76 It further focused on the creation of good 
decisions on a large scale, even at the expense of static legal doctrine.77 The broad interpretive 
nature of Llewellyn’s Grand Style is thus a forerunner to the interpretive method favoured by 
Dworkin.78 Llewellyn often makes statements which appear similar to Dworkin’s view on rules 
                                                 
73 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 6) 157. 
74 K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (n 54) 36-37. 
75 K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (n 54) 38. 
76 As Schauer notes, Llewellyn “often stressed the role of the judge in seeking to reach, albeit in small steps, the best 
solution to a general social problem.” Frederich Schauer, “Legal Realism Untamed” (n 7). See also W. Twining, Karl 
Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1973) 203-269. 
77 K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (n 54) 36-37. 
78 For a similar view in relation to Llewellyn’s view of principles, see M.D.A. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to 
Jurisprudence(8th edition) (Sweet and Maxwell 2008)1016. 
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and principles. For example, in The Theory of Rules, Llewellyn argues for the use of the purposes of 
law in order to provide a more coherent basis for the law.79  
 
He also prioritises the use of conceptions of justice and fairness, two of the foundational 
principles Dworkin deems important in the law.80 Llewellyn’s view, thus, looks remarkably 
similar to Dworkin’s views on integrity. He highlights the purposes of reasons as opposed to 
slavish dependence on written rules; the notion of change according to those purposes and 
reasons for rules and that it is these elements in the law, not written rules, which provide for the 
stability of the law.81 Llewellyn, consequently, appears to have a number of similar views to those 
expressed by Dworkin. 
 
The real issue is what this might mean for our understanding of both Realism and law as 
integrity. One initial conclusion we can reach is that neither theory is quite as extreme as its 
detractors suggest. Realism has long been a frequent whipping boy for legal theorists because it is 
believed to be an over-exaggerated farcical theory about judges which lacks sufficient intellectual 
rigour.82 Dworkin has also been subject to criticism, particularly in relation to the right answer 
                                                 
79 K. Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules (n 34) 136-137. It is worth noting that, while Llewellyn argues against the use of 
“principles” in this passage, his understanding of “principle” is different to Dworkin’s. He objects to principles used 
when “it is to serve, and can claim to serve, as a basis for judgment not only independently of any countervailing 
authoritative and more explicit words, but also independently of any examination of its own underlying reason.” Ibid. at 136. 
For Dworkin, of course, any principle requires an understanding an application of the underlying reason for the 
principle. It thus corresponds to what Llewellyn wants to be done with reasons – “it requires by its formulation and 
in its formulation to give reason for it to be taken as the reason, and to persuade that there is reason for it to be taken 
as the reason.” Ibid. at 137.  
80 W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (n 94) 215. 
81 K. Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules (n 34) 142. 
82 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence (n 1) p. 1. 
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thesis as it too is considered an over-exaggerated position.83 However, neither theory need be 
understood in the extreme view. The acceptance of the Dworkinian view does not mean that one 
need accept that legal problems have solutions which are discernible like mathematical problems 
any more than one need accept that judicial decisions are based upon what the judge had for 
breakfast in order to accept Realism. Both positions are much more moderate than they may 
initially seem. Moreover, both focus on the important aspect of problem cases. While other 
theories have attempted to start with the areas in which there is convergence, both Realism and 
Dworkin appear to begin their analysis with cases of disagreement. Dworkin and Realism both 
seek to explain how it is possible for disagreement to exist in law instead of trying to explain our 
general agreement about the law Realism and Dworkin provide a much more satisfactory view of 
those types of decisions as a consequence. We can further take from this the view that both 
theories see law as being part of a community. The law is not a separate institution which acts on 
its own without any input from the other important aspects of our lives. Law is important 
because it incorporates, uses, evaluates and modifies the society and communities in which we 
live. We cannot explore and explain the law without coming to some understanding about what 
it is supposed to effect, both in terms of real life implications empirically as well as the 
underlying principles of the society in question. Law, then, is not a closed set, but one which 
necessarily involves a range of different factors. 
 
Additionally, exploring how Realism and Dworkin’s integrity can work together sharpens focus 
on the important elements involved in judicial decision-making. As has been noted above, 
Realism often suffers from criticisms about particularism. It is alleged that because the Realists 
viewed legal decisions as indeterminate, that meant they must believe that each individual 
decision was particular to the factual scenario. This, though, is a mischaracterization and one that 
Dworkin helps to combat. If one sees indeterminism as a necessary ingredient of, first 
                                                 
83 R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 82) 41 -43. 
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Llewellyn’s views on judging, and then Dworkin’s idea of law as integrity, it becomes clearer why 
indeterminism does not lead, necessarily, to claims about particularlism. Understanding that the 
set of factual, legal and moral interactions which go into a judicial decisions are complex does 
not mean that prediction is not possible nor does it mean that general rules cannot be created 
from those decisions. Instead, it means that in order to properly understand the reasoning 
behind those decisions, it is crucial to be able to grasp the entire picture. Some of those might be 
particularities about a particular judge – Lord Denning’s noted bias towards the plight of elderly 
ladies is one example – but most involve aspects of judicial decisions which are normalised 
within the practice itself. These might be notions of fairness or justice which are outside of the 
strict legal rules; these might be biases or preconceptions which are implicit within the legal or 
more general community in which a specific court is situated.  
 
Both Dworkin and the Realists then, help us focus on what is really at the heart of problems 
about judicial decision-making. Decisions made by judges are difficult to understand 
jurisprudentially because of the wide power and scope implicit in the process. Judges are not 
(and indeed probably cannot) be bound by a mechanistic application of pre-existing rules. If they 
could, we would have little reason to have people engaged in the practice instead of sophisticated 
computers which could sift through the legal statutes in an attempt to determine the most 
efficient legal outcome. That does not mean that we expect judges to be totally unfettered. What 
we expect then is a balance between the strict legal rules and the flexibility needed in specific 
cases. Using Dworkin’s theory of integrity and the Realist indeterminacy thesis allows us to 
explore in greater depth that balance. 
 
Furthermore, if we understand where there are similarities we can then begin to focus on those 
differences which are truly at issue. For Dworkin and the Realists, there is still the considerable 
issue of determining the extent to which reasons for decisions which are not previous cases or 
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statutes are considered legal.84 For Dworkin, reasons for actions which are used by judges (i.e. 
moral principles) are legal reasons. Indeed, for Dworkin, a judge, should she wish to be able to 
provide real justification for a decision, must use reasons which are legal. It is not possible for a 
judge to use a non-legal reason, or at least not use one and still provide a justifiable legal 
decision. Conversely, the Realists did not consider the additional reasons for action that judges 
used to be legal. Exploring this difference between the two theories might help us better 
understand the extent to which we must rely on ‘legal’ reasons for decision-making as well as the 
extent to which we can fruitfully have a single definition of ‘legal’. It might be, instead, that we 
would be better off looking at a multi-faceted description of legal (for example, something closer 
to what Llewellyn did with his idea of ‘law jobs’)85 than we are focusing on a single overriding 
definition.  
 
Another issue which is worthy of further exploration is the distinction between justification and 
coercion. I have argued that Dworkin follows Realism and helps to close the justification gap 
that exists in that older theory. This is important only if one believes that the justification gap 
problem is important and there is nothing that requires a legal theorist to believe that it is. One 
can simply rely on the notions of power and coercion to explain why individuals follow the law. 
Such a view, however, can be impoverished. Austin attempted to explain the law as a function of 
coercion and power and most modern jurisprudential scholars believe his theory provides a 
distorted view of the law. The common view now is that law is much more nuanced and 
complex to be explained only in terms of coercion. Law provides not only a coercive element but 
a facilitative one as well and legal theories need to be able to analyse these important elements as 
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well. Exploring ways in which the differences between Realism and Dworkin on this important 
issue can provide a mechanism for the larger issue of justification within the law.    
Not all problems, then, are eliminated even if we look to explore similarities between theories as 
opposed to differences. What we can take from this overall is the view that legal theory need not 
be an all or nothing thing. We need not accept wholeheartedly only one theory and argue that all 
others are incorrect. This is rarely accurate and usually can only be explained by mistakenly 
describing the theories of others. In reality, there is often far more in common between legal 
theories than there are differences. If we examine theories in order to properly understand those 
things which a theory might do well, then we are likely to be better able to explain the complex 
phenomenon that is law and legal systems generally. This does not mean, of course, that we can 
eliminate all differences between legal theories. There will still be disagreements, even on 
important fundamental issues. Nor does it mean we ought to give up critiquing jurisprudential 
theories. Of course we should not.  Exploring similarities to the extent we explore differences, 
however, can be a more useful endeavour in at least some circumstances. Our critiques, then, 
ought to look at ways in which theories correspond to each other just as much as they explore 
ways they differ.  
